Title:
Implications of the Wars of the War on Terrorism:
An Intelligence Approach
Abstract:
Using an
intelligence framework this paper analysis the impact of the two conventional
wars of the ‘War on Terrorism’. Focused upon al Qaeda topics examined include
the motives of terrorism, radicalisation, targeting and undermining legitimacy
of the United States. Examples utalised includes the Madrid Bombings and Gadhafi
regime abandoning its weapons program. Where the interests of countries are
seen as conceding with the wars their leaders withstood any blowback that
occurred as a result of their involvement with the conflicts. It is the contention of the paper that these
conflicts – especially Iraq – have had a significant impact at the tactical,
operational and strategic level: some of which have positive, and many have been
negative. Most strikingly at the height of the Iraq War, Iraq became the center
of gravity of terrorism.
Keywords:
Terrorist
motives, War on Terror, Madrid Bombing, Blowback, Intelligence, Libya, al
Qaeda, Iraq War.
Paper:
The
purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq on terrorism. Both of these wars are part of the Bush Administration’s ‘War
on Terror.’ It is the contention of this
paper that these conflicts – especially Iraq – have had a significant impact. In
the complex world of international relations this is not surprising. For
instance, the first United States foray into the Middle East had an impact that
can be traced to the current day. In
1953 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated a coup d'état replacing the elected left leaning Prime Minister Mossadegh with the
repressive Mohammad Reza Shah, the Shah of Iran. A line can be drawn connecting
these events, the 1980 Islamic Revolution and the evolution of modern terrorism:
particularly Hezbollah and Hamas.[i] This paper has been divided into
three distinct parts. It will begin with a brief examination of the wars along
with al Qaeda and the doctrine of the Bush administration in the war on terror.
This will be followed by the introduction of three concepts (i) blowback; (ii)
terrorist motives; and (iii) intelligence. The reminder of the paper will use
those intelligence concepts to examine the impacts of the wars on terrorism.
Al Qaeda
will be used as the focus of this paper for the following reasons: (i) al Qaeda
and its affiliates are representative of the current threat; (ii) any adaption
undertaken by al Qaeda will eventually flow to other movements, just as suicide
terrorism evolved from Lebanon to Sri Lanka[ii];
and (iii) simply it is far beyond the scope of this paper to examine other
groups in depth. As part of this examination statistics will be drawn from a
number of sources including opinion polls, electoral results and other data.
Al Qaeda, Afghanistan War and Iraq
War.
Osama bin
Laden’s radicalisation set a pathway that many have since followed. Drawn to
the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s, a twenty-three
year old bin Laden moved to Peshawar Pakistan where he used his business skills
to organise the flow of Saudi funds to the fighters in Afghanistan, working
with the Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the CIA.[iii] Bin Laden returned to Saudi
Arabia after Soviet forces withdrew and United States funds dried up. When
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, bin Laden, not an ally of the
Hussein regime, wrote to the Saudi ruler offering his ‘Afghan Arabs’ to defend
the emirate. Nevertheless, Bin Laden’s overtures were rebuffed and the regime
turning to the United States for support. An outraged bin Laden first knew of
the decision from news reports.[iv]
The 1991
Gulf War saw Iraqi forces expelled from Kuwait and the crushing of the Iraqi
military apparatus. Nevertheless, United States military forces established permanent
bases on Saudi territory and a low intensity conflict continued with Iraq based
upon sanctions, no fly zones and the occasional short military engagement. This
stationing of foreign forces on the Arabian Peninsula – the home of the Islamic
holy places of Mecca and Medina – were to feature heavily in future bin Laden
rhetoric.
The
West’s occupation of our country is old, yet new, and the confrontation and
conflict between us and them started centuries ago. . . . It was the true
commitment to Islam that reshaped the Arab character. . . Islamic countries in
the past were not liberated from the Crusaders’ military occupation except
through jihad . . .[v]
Bin Laden became increasingly alienated from the Saudi regime eventually obtaining sanctuary in Sudan, then Afghanistan. It was during this time that bin Laden transformed his logistical support apparatus for the jihad against the Soviets into al Qaeda.[vi] Sociologist Michael Mann sums up bin Laden’s motives: he “. . . is a rational man. There is a simple reason why he attacked the US: American Imperialism. As long as America seeks to control the Middle East, he and people like him will be its enemy.”[vii]
The 9/11
attacks were not the first time al Qaeda has targeted the U.S: previous
examples include the Kenyan and Tanzania embassy attacks of 1998, the USS Cole
of 1999, and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre, the first bin Laden
linked attack on United States soil.[viii]
However, 9/11 was definitely a ‘game changer.’ David Frum argues that only once
before after Libyan agents targeted United States serviceman in 1986 -- resulting
in air strikes on Tripoli -- had an American President interpreted a “. . .
terrorist atrocity as an act of war, demanding a proportionately warlike
response [.]”[ix] In
keeping with the war rhetoric, the Bush Administration launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 with significant support of the
international community.[x] The United States achieved its
objective, removing the Taliban without significant commitment of ground
forces. Nevertheless, Bush had assumed “. . . the power of a war time president
[.]”[xi]
The
administration favoured the doctrine of a “. . . country’s right to self-defense,
and not its right, or obligation to intervene elsewhere to protect people other
than their own.”[xii] Attention was then turned to the ‘neo-conservatives’
long standing adversary Saddam Hussein. Based upon Hussein’s failure to cooperate
with United Nations weapons inspectors, Operation Iraqi Freedom began 20 March 2003 with a massive aerial
bombardment. The United States was not prepared for the occupation: anarchy and
looting soon developed leaving a vacuum for radicals to fill.[xiii] Paul Wolfowitz argues that World
War Two examples Germany and Japan were not an ideal precedent and preferred
France where “ . . . if the Allies had gone ahead with the plan for an
occupation government the Communists would have . . . taken over the
countryside while the occupation would have neutered the Gaullists.”[xiv]
This scenario played out in Iraq.
Statistics
have shown that since the commencement of the Iraq War, terrorist activity
increased by 80 percent.[xv]
Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank argue that since the Iraq War the risk
factors for a country becoming the target of terrorism are influenced by:
1. Whether the country participated in the war;
2. Geographical proximity to Iraq;
3. The degree to which there is identification in the
country with the Iraqi people; and
4. The level of exchanges of ideas or personnel with
those in Iraq.[xvi]
This has
seen Iraq become what Chandler and Gunaratna have described as the new center
of gravity for terrorism from 2003, following the predecessors of Lebanon
(1970-80s) and Afghanistan (1990).[xvii]
During
these conflicts the United States placed a growing importance on the gathering
of intelligence to prevent casualties and terrorist attacks.[xxiii] Although intelligence may be
credible it does not necessarily mean that it is accurate. For instance, former
Deputy Director of the CIA remarked that there was ‘stronger’ intelligence of
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction than Bin Laden was living in Abbottabad
Pakistan.[xxiv] From an intelligence perspective
activities can be broken into strategic, operational and tactical level.[xxv]
Strategic relates to overall objectives, operational relates to how strategic
goals are to be achieved and sets the parameters for tactical decision making.
Charles
Johnson defines blowback as the unintended consequences of policies a term originally used internally by
the CIA but has now been adopted and applied to international relations in
general.[xxvi]
This is the rebounding of policy against the interests of its perpetrator.[xxvii] The first CIA blowback was the previously
outlined 1953 coup d'état in Iran. It is argued that there has been a
significant blowback - at the tactical, operational and strategic levels – with
the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Some has been positive most has been negative.
The remainder of this paper will focus on these developments.
Tactical implications – radicalisation
and training ground
Ron
Suskind outlines how the over reaction of United States Secret Service agents
almost led to the radicalisation of Usman Khasa.[xxviii]
Pakistani born Usman was educated in, and a long term resident of, the United
States One morning whilst walking to
work past the White House he stopped to allow the Presidential motorcade to
past. Moments later he was descended upon by United States Secret Service
agents, detained and questioned for the rest of the day. This was for allegedly
acting suspiciously: namely wearing a backpack, using an iPod and looking South
Asian. Usman afterwards felt very marginalised and alienated.[xxix]
It was only luck that other factors did not coincide and see him radicalised.
Radicalisation has been one of the major tactical impacts outside the war theaters.
The
British Joint Intelligence Committee remarked in 2006 that the Iraq War “. . .
has re-enforced the determination of terrorists who were already committed to
attacking the West and motivated others who were not.”[xxx] In a study following the London bombing of 7
July 2004 (7/7) the United Kingdom Home Office found that their foreign policy
was one of the root causes of terrorism: the Iraq War was a highly visible component of that
policy at the time.[xxxi]
Interestingly, in her testimony to the Chilcot Inquiry -- a public inquiry examining
the legitimacy of the actions of the United Kingdom leading up at the Iraq War
-- Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5 (the United Kingdom
Security Service), gave evidence that the invasion of Iraq ‘substantially’
increased the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom and that she was not
surprised that United Kingdom nationals were involved in 7/7.[xxxii]
Marc Sageman has identified three waves of radicalisation resulting from
blowback.[xxxiii] The
first wave was the returning Afghan Arabs who had fought the Soviets in the
1980, the obvious example bin Laden. The second wave are expatriates who had
gone to the west for education and were marginalised and isolated by the
experience, such as the 9/11 hijackers.[xxxiv] The third wave are self-radicalised by anger
relating to the invasion of Iraq, for instance Younis Tgouli the internet
propagandist.[xxxv] There
are two factors which have influenced the self-radicalisated group. First being
jihadist veterans who had fought not only in Afghanistan (1980s), but also
Bosnia and Chechnya (1990s). The second, images available via the internet of
suffering Muslims at the ‘hands of the wicket Americans’ in Iraq, like the
generation before who saw television images of suffering in Sarajevo Bosnia
with the west standing idle.[xxxvi]
Radicalisation
in itself is a significant issue; however, this is compounded by the training
received in the wars. It has been estimated that in the first three years of
the conflict over three hundred Muslims living in Europe had travelled to Iraq.[xxxvii] Chandler and Gunaratna argue that
this is “. . . two-way-traffic of those going to fight in Iraq and then return
to Europe, to share their experience, recruit and raise funds [.]”[xxxviii]
Like their predecessors in Afghanistan and Bosnia, the new Iraq War alumni will
be experienced fighters, experience gained against what many claim to be the
“arguably the best army in history.”[xxxix] The techniques developed in Iraq –
such as improvised explosive devises -- have already found their way into the
Afghanistan theater and more recently Syria.[xl] Furthermore, if history is any
predicator, the innovations from these conflicts will also soon be adapted in
western settings: there have already
been some attempts such as the June 2007 London and Glasgow plot.[xli]
Unlike
Afghanistan, Iraq does not have natural terrain -- mountains, forests etc. – to
provide protected training camps: the majority of training is decentralised in
mobile camps or safe houses. This has led to training based on small cell
structures, a prerequisite to operate in western cities.[xlii] Expert knowledge of such things
as bomb making and weapons handling is disseminated through the safe houses via
video recordings which have since been uploaded to the internet making them
available to anyone worldwide.[xliii] However, the effectiveness of such online training
attracts conflicting views. Tonnessen argues that one of the greatest
contributes of the Iraq War has been middle management training: the Iraqi
alumni will leave with the skills, knowledge and connections to become
terrorist cell leaders. [xliv]
Operational Impacts – Target Madrid.
The Iraq
War was controversial internationally and the Bush Administration formed a ‘coalition
of the willing’ after failed attempts to establish a United Nations flagged
operation.[xlv] Attempting to break this coalition
became an operational goal of al Qaeda, evident in a number of posts to the Global Islamic Media message board. In Jihadi Iraq – Hopes and Risks posted on 10 December 2003 it was argued that if
one or two members of the coalition left, it would fail and “. . . break its [the
United States’] will to fight in Iraq.”[xlvi] Paralleling Pape and Feldman, Spain
was identified as the weakest link:
. . .
neither Poland nor Spain has real significant interest in Iraq . . .even
Britain does not have the kind of priority interests in Iraq, which makes it
endure large sacrifices . . . We think that the Spanish government could not
tolerate more than two, maximum of three blows. . . If its troops still remain in Iraq after
these blows, then the victory of the socialists Party is almost guaranteed.[xlvii]
This was
preceded by another posting on 8 December 2003 that called upon the Spanish people
to withdraw their forces from Iraq or “Spanish interests outside Iraq would be
attacked.”[xlviii] The stage was set for one of the deadliest
recent attacks on European soil: Madrid bombing of 11 March 2004 (11-M).
The
authors of the posts on Global Islamic Media were correct;
the Iraq War was highly unpopular amongst the Spaniards. John Lloyd argues that
the “. . . electorate . . . had been,
according to opinion polls, 91% opposed to the Iraq War . . . faced with a huge
act of terror which can be reasonably thought to be stimulated by the Spanish
government’s support for the war.”[xlix] The Iraq War was the first time
since the early nineteenth century that Spanish forces participated in a foreign
war: war for Spaniards is synonymous with bitter violent civil internal
conflicts.[l] Despite the war being unpopular,
Spanish President Aznar according to Charles Powell “. . . interpreted 9/11 as
the beginning of a new post-post-Cold War era – an era that offered fresh
opportunities for Spain in the international arena.”[li] Nevertheless, Aznar’s Popular
Party (Spanish: Partido Popular) (PP) was predicted to win the upcoming
election under a new leader Rajoy. In the two week campaign opinion polls
conducted just prior to 11-M, 43% favored PP whilst 36% the Spanish Socialist
Workers' Party (Spanish: Partido Socialista Obrero Español) (PSOE).[lii] The main question was if PP would
receive a majority, although the PSOE was making some gains.[liii] This was to change on 11 March
2004: a team of men planted explosives in backpacks on three trains before they
set off from Alcalade Henares. At 7.37am the first of the explosions occurred:
176 people were killed, 15 would later die and over 1750 were injured.[liv] Initially the PP blamed the
Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and continued to do so even
though this was denied and evidence started to point towards Islamic
extremists.[lv]
Suspicion
started to mount and protests occurred around Spain with placards demanding the
truth.[lvi]
The day before the election a video recording was found claiming responsibility
for 11-M on behalf of al Qaeda and linking the attack to Spanish involvement in
Iraq and Afghanistan and more would follow if troops were not immediately
withdrawn. The turnout for the polls on 14 March was the highest in modern history:
75.7% up by 7% from 2000.[lvii] The result is reproduced in the
following table[lviii]:
|
Party
|
2000 Seats
|
2004 Seats
|
|
PP
|
183
|
140
|
|
PSOE
|
125
|
164
|
This was
an increase in total votes rather than a shift in support: for instance in
Madrid the PP lost only 66 749 votes whilst PSOE gained 507 286 votes.[lix] M-11 placed Iraq at the center of the minds
of the population at a time when they were experiencing considerable
psychological trauma: a study following 11-M found 46.7% presented with
symptoms of acute stress and 46.6% depression.[lx] Twenty-eight percent of people
polled believed that 11-M had influenced their vote and 64% that the attacks
would not have happened if the country was not involved with the Iraq War.[lxi] This was a success for al Qaeda,
nor the last time they would attempt to influence domestic politics: 7/7 is an
example. Furthermore, the 2004 Australian federal election was targeted with
the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta a month before the poll.[lxii] Unlike Spain, Australia and the United
Kingdom were willing to absorb the attacks as their leaders saw their involvement
in these theaters as in the national interest: an example of Pape and Feldman’s
theory.
Strategic implications – positives
and negatives.
Throughout
this paper negative impacts of the wars have been mentioned. On the strategic
front there were positives and negatives. The positive to be discussed relates
to Libya abandoning its chemical, biological and nuclear programs. The negative
is the squandering of the good will and support the United States enjoyed post
9/11.
Libya is
an interesting case: throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Gadhafi regime
conducted a low intensity conflict with the United States hitting back at
attempts to use cohesion to reverse its pro-terrorism policy.[lxiii] As previously mentioned, it was
against Libya that the United States first responded by unilaterally bombing
the capital in response to a terrorist attack in 1986. Paralleling the Iraq War,
this intervention relied upon ‘the doctrine of self-defence’ and also was
received negatively by the international community.[lxiv] After the bombing of Pan Am
flight 103, a series of interconnecting sanctions and other measures isolated
the regime. Peter Jakobsen argues that it was a multilayered process of
coercion, carrots and confidence that led to the regime giving up their weapons
programs. He argues that “. . . multilateral sanctions and the overthrows of
the Taliban and Saddam Hussein were necessary in order to create a sense of
urgency for compliance and make the carrots on offer attractive.”[lxv]
Gadhafi was concerned that since Germany, Russia and France could not stop the
Iraq War, United States unilateralism was unstoppable and his regime could be
added to the axis of evil.[lxvi] This is evident in a telephone
call he had with the Italian president: “I will do whatever the Americans want,
because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.”[lxvii] Although Gadhafi publically played
this down emphasising that he was already in negotiation before the Iraq War.[lxviii]
The strategic impact of the Iraq War made the consequences of pursuing a ‘rogue
weapons program’ unacceptably high without an effective deterrent to United
States intervention: for instance, Iran and North Korea could respectively close
the Strait of Hormuz and shell Seoul.[lxix]
Furthermore, there is some evidence that Bin Laden’s quest for unconventional
weapons as a deterrent against United States intervening in Afghanistan.[lxx]
David
Forsythe argues that “. . . with the growing American power came a growing activism
to . . . promote human rights and democracy abroad . . . this became . . . the
US central mission in the world.”[lxxi]
However, this image was seriously damaged particularly by the Iraq War: rather
than promoting human rights and taking the moral high ground the administration
redefined the Geneva and torture conventions to allow for ‘torture lite’ -- the
abuse of prisoners – and also the extraordinary rendition of prisoners to third
countries such as Egypt where torture was commonplace.[lxxii]
This policy was domestically supported with 44% believing torture was justified
to prevent an attack.[lxxiii] The possibilities of blowback of
this policy were identified by United States military lawyers as undermining
the protections these conventions would offer to their personnel.[lxxiv]
David Forsythe draws on history to show the quandary American diplomats
promoting human rights now face:
British
diplomat talked to a Nazi official about the German concentration camps. The
Nazi pulled off his shelf an account of the British concentration camps in the
Boer War, in which almost 30,000 persons died, mainly women and children. End
of discussion.[lxxv]
Paul
Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Bush Administration stated: “We
paid a serious price in the eyes of the world for that prolonged occupation [of
Iraq], particularly in the Arab World[.]”[lxxvi]That
is quite evident with the decrease in popularity of the United States in Muslim
countries seen in the table below:[lxxvii]
|
Country
|
2002
|
2003
|
|
Jordon
|
25%
|
1%
|
|
Lebanon
|
30%
|
15%
|
|
Indonesia
|
61%
|
15%
|
As a
consequence Bush’s successor Obama has adopted what has become known as the
‘light footprint doctrine’: any United States intervention in a foreign country
should be carried out indirectly or remotely through allies, local forces or
drones.[lxxviii] This is basically an anything but
Bush policy which has led many in the international community -- such as France
and Israel – question if the United States can be relied upon in an international
crisis.[lxxix] At the time of writing this is
now occurring with regards to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil
war and may lead to
Syria becoming the next center of gravity for terrorism.[lxxx]
Conclusion
This paper has argued there has been significant
impact upon terrorism by the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars at a tactical,
operational and strategic level. Particularly the Iraq War has provided a stimulus
to jihadist terrorism creating a new center of gravity and harmonising the
movement against one enemy. It was the Bush Administration taking a war stance following
9/11 which saw it going against international opinion and thereby undermining
its own legitimacy: one of the motives of terrorism. For those countries that
did support the Iraq War they would become targets of residents radicalised by
images of suffering Muslims in these wars and simulated by posts on message
boards such as
Global Islamic Media. In a demonstration of Pape
and Feldman’s theory, countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom where
the participation was seen as coinciding with the national interests al Qaeda
attacks were withstood: in Spain it was not and ultimately a government would
fall. The conflicts will have a larger strategic effect with the United States adopting
a more isolationist stance which, history has shown, is not a benefit to
international peace and security.[lxxxi]
[i] S. Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American coup and the roots of
Middle East terror (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. 2003), p.
202.
[ii] J. White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 6th edn,
(Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 2009), p 253.
[iii] O. Bin Laden ‘Introduction’ and
‘Resist the New Rome’ (J. Howarth Trans.) In B. Lawrence (ed) Messages to the World: the
statements of Osama Bin Laden (London: Verso. 2005),
p.xii.
[iv] R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global network of terror
(Melbourne: Scribe Publications. 2002), p. 27.
[v] O. Bin Laden ‘Introduction’ and
‘Resist the New Rome’ (J. Howarth Trans.) In B. Lawrence (ed) Messages to the World: the
statements of Osama Bin Laden, (London: Verso. 2005), p.
217-218.
[vi] J. Corbin, The Base: al-Qaeda and the changing face of global
terror (London: Pocket Books. 2003), p. 33.
[vii] O. Bin Laden ‘Introduction’ and
‘Resist the New Rome’ (J. Howarth Trans.) In B. Lawrence (ed) Messages to the World: the
statements of Osama Bin Laden, (London: Verso. 2005), p.
xx.
[viii] R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global network of terror
(Melbourne: Scribe Publications. 2002), p. 6.
[ix] D. Frum, The Right Man: An inside account of the surprise presidency of George
W. Bush. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 2003), p.143.
[x] M. Chandler and R. Gunaratna,
‘Iraq: a strategic defeat?’ In Countering Terrorism: Can we meet the threat of global violence? (London: Reaktion. 2007), p. 70.
[xi] R. Shepard, ‘Towards a Theory
of Simulated Atonement: A case study of President George W. Bush’s response to
the Abu Ghraib torture scandal.’ Communication Studies. 60(5)
(2009), p. 460-475, p. 472.
[xii] F. Burkle, B. Woodruff and E. Noji,
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[xiii] P. McGeough, (2003) In Baghdad: A reporter’s war. Sydney:
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[xiv] (Bacevich et.al., 2013, p 18)
A. Bacevich, J. Diehl, M. Hayden, W. Laqueur,
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[xv] C. Conetta, ‘War &
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[xvi] P. Bergen, and P. Cruickshank,
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[xvii] M. Chandler and R. Gunaratna,
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[xviii] S. Pinto and G. Wardlaw, Political Violence. (Canberra:
Australian Institute of Criminology 1989). p. 4.
[xix] C. Williams, Terrorism Explained: The facts about terrorism and
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[xx] C. Williams, Terrorism Explained: The facts about terrorism and
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[xxi] L. Richardson, (2006). What terrorists want. (London:
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[xxiii] G. Hook and C. Mosher, ‘Outrages
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Social Forces. 83(4) (2005), pp 1627-1646, p1636.
[xxiv] A. Bacevich, J. Diehl, M. Hayden,
W. Laqueur, M. O’Sullivan, R. Perle, D. Rieff, and P. Wolfowitz, ‘Lessons
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29.
[xxv] J. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing. (Oregon:
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[xxvi] C. Johnson, Blowback: The costs and
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[xxvii] ‘Jihadist Blowback? Syria and
Lebanon.’ The
Economist. (4 October 2008) p 41.
[xxviii] R. Suskind, The Way of the World: a story of truth and hope in an
age of extremism. (London: Simon & Schuster. 2008), p. 27.
[xxix] R. Suskind, The Way of the World: a story of truth and hope in an
age of extremism. (London: Simon & Schuster. 2008), p.
68-69.
[xxx] C. Conetta, ‘War &
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Alternatives Briefing Memo #38. (2006), p. 3.
[xxxi] Warraich, S. and Nawaz, I. (Preventing Extremism Together:
Working Groups. (London: U.K. Home Office. 2005),
p. 75.
[xxxii] ‘Iraq inquiry: Ex-MI5 boss says war raised terror
threat’ BBC News.
(20 July 2010)
[xxxiii] M. Sageman, ‘The Next
Generation of Terror.’ Foreign Policy. 165 (2008), p. 36-42, p.38.
[xxxiv] M. Sisson, (2011) ‘September 11 Attacks.’ In Gus Martin
(ed) The Sage Encyclopedia of
Terrorism. 2nd edn. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications. 2011),
p. 533.
[xxxv] M. Sageman, ‘The Next
Generation of Terror.’ Foreign Policy. 165 (2008), p. 36-42, p.
37.
[xxxvi] M. Hosenball, and E. Thomas,
‘Blowback.’
Newsweek. (21 June 2010) p. 26. and M. Sageman, ‘The Next Generation of Terror.’ Foreign Policy. 165
(2008), p. 36-42, p. 40.
[xxxvii] ‘The Jihad – Change and
Continuation.’
Military Technology. 12 (2005), p. 38-41, p. 41.
[xxxviii] M. Chandler and R. Gunaratna,
(‘Iraq: a strategic defeat?’ In Countering Terrorism: Can we meet the threat of global violence? (London: Reaktion. 2007), p. 65.
[xxxix] P. Bergen, and A. Reynolds,
‘Blowback Revisited.’ Foreign Affairs. 84(6) (2005), p 2.
[xl] P. Bergen, and A. Reynolds,
‘Blowback Revisited.’ Foreign Affairs. 84(6) (2005), p 2.
[xli] A. Fratta, ‘Post-9/11 Responders
to Mass Casualty Bombings in Europe: Lessons, trends, and implications for the
United States.’
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p. 364 – 385, p 377 and 380.
[xlii] T. Tonnessen, ‘Training on a
Battlefield: Iraq as a training ground for global jihadist.’ Terrorism and Political
Violence. 20 (2008), pp. 543-562, p.550.
[xliii] P. Jakobsen, ‘Reinterpreting
Libya’s WMD Turnaround-Bridging the Carrot-Coercion Divide.’ Journal of Strategic Studies.
35(4) (2012), pp. 489-512, p. 553.
[xliv] Tonnessen (2008, p 588) T. Tonnessen, ‘Training on a Battlefield: Iraq as a training ground for
global jihadist.’ Terrorism
and Political Violence. 20 (2008), pp. 543-562,
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